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ABSTRACT
We study budget formation in a model featuring separation of powers. In our model, the legislature
designs a budget bill that can include a cap on total spending and earmarked allocations to designated
public  projects.  Each  project  provides  random  benefits  to  one  of  many  interest  groups.  The
legislature can delegate spending decisions to the executive, who can observe the productivity of all
projects before choosing which to fund. However, the ruling coalition in the legislature and the
executive serve different constituencies, so their interests are not perfectly aligned. We consider
settings that differ in terms of the breadth and overlap in the constituencies of the two branches, and
associate these with the political systems and circumstances under which they most naturally arise.
Earmarks are more likely to occur when the executive serves broad interests, while a binding budget














Separation of powers implies a division of labor among the branches of government. Most
notably, this doctrine calls for the legislature to legislate and the executive to execute. The
U.S. Constitution is structured this way, vesting authority for lawmaking with the Houses of
Congress while charging the President to ￿take care that the laws be faithfully executed.￿A
similar division of responsibilities is common to many other presidential systems of govern-
ment. And even in parliamentary systems, where legislative and executive powers typically
are fused, institutions may exist that give some independent decision-making authority to the
legislature and primary responsibility for enforcing laws to the agencies. Con￿ ict between the
authors and the implementers of the laws can readily arise in parliamentary systems when
polities are ruled by coalition or minority governments.
The separation of powers confronts legislators with an important dilemma. The lawmak-
ing body can write detailed statutes that leave little discretion to the agencies and thereby
ensure close adherence to its intentions and desires, or it can use more ambiguous language to
provide those who enact the laws with latitude to respond to perceived conditions. In other
words, a legislature must decide on the optimal degree of delegation: Should it exercise its
lawmaking powers strictly and rigidly by tailoring speci￿c policies and procedures or should
it delegate some aspects of policy making to bureaucrats, who may have greater expertise
and access to more current and complete information?
A rich literature has developed that treats theoretically and (to a lesser extent) empiri-
cally the legislature￿ s choice of how much to delegate and in what circumstances. Especially
notable are the contributions of Epstein and O￿ Halloran (1994, 1996, 1999), who formulated
a canonical model of delegation that has set the stage for much of what has followed. In their
model, the legislature faces a dichotomous choice between delegating authority or not in the
formation of some abstract policy. If the legislature chooses to delegate, it sets a baseline
policy and a permissible degree of discretion in the face of some unresolved uncertainty. Then
the agency, which has a di⁄erent ideal outcome from the legislature, learns the state of the
world and sets policy within the bounds allowed by the law. In the absence of delegation,
the legislature directly sets the policy behind a veil of ignorance. This framework has been
extended by Ting (2001,2002), Gailmard (2002), Volden (2002), McCarty (2004) and others
to include legislative information gathering, executive appointment of bureaucrats, legisla-
tive control of agency budgets, executive veto authority, and possible subversion by agencies,
among other considerations.1 In most of this literature, the policy space is treated as unidi-
mensional and the legislature￿ s and executive￿ s preferences are described by quadratic losses
that result from departures of the policy from their ideal outcomes.2
1For a survey of the literature on political delegation, see Bendor, Glazer and Hammond (2001).
2An exception is Bender and Meirowitz (2004), who keep the spatial structure of Epstein and O￿ Halloran,
1In this paper, we apply the central ideas of the literature on separation of powers to a
particular but important policy problem. Here, we focus on the formation of ￿the budget,￿
by which we mean the level of federal spending and its allocation among public projects. By
modeling the budgetary process in a stylized but more detailed manner, we are able to derive
predictions that go beyond those obtainable by Epstein and O￿ Halloran and others who have
followed their approach. In particular, we treat the budget bill as a law that speci￿es a
maximum amount that the executive can spend and that lists a set of ￿earmarks,￿which are
projects to which the executive is bound to devote resources. The various possible projects
bene￿t di⁄erent ￿groups￿in society, which may be de￿ned by geographic regions of residence
or by other shared interests. The legislature and executive have di⁄erent ￿constituencies,￿
which are the sets of groups that they seek to serve with their budget decisions. The amount
and allocation of spending is decided by the executive, subject to the constraints imposed
by the budget bill, and is ￿nanced by a broadly-based poll tax. The executive is assumed
to know the productivity of the di⁄erent possible projects by the time she must decide the
actual level of spending and allocate resources, whereas the legislature must formulate its
budget bill behind a veil of ignorance.
Our stylized model of the budget process abstracts from important di⁄erences in the ways
budgets are formed in di⁄erent polities. For example, a variety of rules and practices govern
the timing and sequencing of budget votes; the legislature may ￿rst vote on the size of the
budget and subsequently consider its composition, or it may vote directly on appropriations,
leaving overall budget size to be determined residually (see Ferejohn and Krehbiel, 1987).
Rules also may di⁄er on the possibilities and procedures for amending budget proposals (see
Baron and Ferejohn, 1989, and Baron, 1991). And the executive branch may play a more or
less active role in formulating a budget proposal. We do not wish to minimize the importance
of such institutional variation. Indeed, Alesina and Perotti (1999) show, in their survey of
the literature on budget institutions, that they do matter for budget outcomes. Rather, we
choose to hold constant the budget-setting rules so that we can compare outcomes across
political regimes that di⁄er in the extent and nature of the con￿ ict in the objectives of the
executive and the legislature. We believe that this is an important source of variation across
regimes￿ although of course not the only such source￿ and its role can best be assessed by
holding other features constant.
In keeping with the approach of O￿ Halloran and Epstein (1999), Bendor and Meirowitz
(2004), and others, we treat the budget bill as an incomplete political contract. That is, we
assume that the legislature cannot write a contingent plan that speci￿es a spending rule for all
the di⁄erent states of the world. This assumption captures the idea that many contingencies
are possible and that the legislature cannot enumerate all of the possible eventualities that
but expand the number of policy dimensions, the manner in which uncertainty a⁄ects outcomes, and form of
the utility functions.
2will in￿ uence where public funds will be most productively spent. The incompleteness of the
contract creates the usual trade-o⁄for the legislature in designing its budget law: By writing
a more detailed bill that speci￿es a long list of earmarked projects and a tight budget cap,
the legislature can ensure that government spending targets only its own constituents; but
this comes at the cost of making the pattern of spending less responsive to the circumstances
that arise. By being explicit about the parameters of the policy statute, we are able to make
predictions about whether and in what circumstances a budget cap is likely to bind and
whether earmarks will force spending on projects that otherwise would go unfunded.
We associate the interests of the politicians with the welfare of the groups that they seek to
represent. While we do not derive these constituencies endogenously, it would be possible to
append an electoral stage to our model in order to do so. Notwithstanding the absence of such
a link to voting, our approach a⁄ords us an opportunity for comparative political analysis.
As Huber and Shipan (2002) have emphasized, the political setting and institutional context
play important roles in determining the degree of con￿ ict between the legislature and the
executive, which in turn colors the incentives for detailed versus ￿ exible legislation. They
(like Epstein and O￿ Halloran) note that divided government is an obvious and empirically
important source of policy con￿ ict in presidential systems, whereas the coalitional status of
the government a⁄ects the degree of such con￿ ict in parliamentary systems. In our analysis,
we shall identify the breadth or narrowness of constituencies and the degree of overlap in the
groups represented by the di⁄erent branches as important political variables that shape the
contours of budget legislation. We distinguish settings in which the executive￿ s constituency
is a subset of the legislature￿ s constituency, and vice versa, as well as situations in which
the constituencies overlap. The executive may represent more narrow interests than the
legislature in a parliamentary system with a coalition government, as the parliament may act
on behalf of all parties included in the coalition, while a minister may pursue primarily his own
party￿ s interests. Alternatively, the executive may represent a broader set of interests than
the legislature in a presidential system, if the executive is elected nationally, the legislature
is elected by region or district, and if a limited set of districts commands the attention and
concern of the majority delegation to the legislature (see, for example, Persson and Tabellini,
2000, ch. 10). Finally, overlapping interests is a common outcome in presidential systems
when the electoral outcome features a divided government. Then the president from one
party and the majority legislative delegation from the other may serve certain groups in
common, while catering di⁄erentially to other groups that are of political interest to only one
party or the other.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we lay out a simple
model of the budget process. In this model, the government collects poll taxes and allocates
spending to projects that bene￿t particular groups in society. For simplicity, we assume
that each project provides bene￿ts to a single group. The productivity of spending on each
3group is random, and the legislature must design the budget bill before the resolution of
uncertainty. The law prescribes a minimum level of spending (or minimal set of projects) for
each group in society as well as a maximum total size of the budget. Once the budget bill
has been passed, uncertainty is resolved and the executive allocates spending subject to the
constraints imposed by the law. The legislature seeks to maximize welfare for a set of groups
L, while the executive serves a (possibly) di⁄erent set of groups E.
Section 3 sets the stage for the subsequent analysis by considering how the budget process
plays out when there is no con￿ ict between the branches of government. This situation, which
may describe a parliamentary system with a majority government, gives rise to full delegation,
as has been noted by Epstein and O￿ Halloran (1999), Bendor and Meirowitz (2004), and
others. In our context, this means that the budget cap is set large enough so that it never
binds and the list of earmarks, if any, is short enough that it too never binds. In Section 4, we
take up the case of ￿narrow executive interests,￿which might arise in a parliamentary system
with a coalition or minority government. We show that the legislature designs a budget with
a spending cap that binds in some states of nature, but it never imposes particular projects
on the executive, except possibly some that she would undertake anyway.
The opposite case of ￿broad executive interests￿ is addressed in Section 5. We argue
that this case may represent a presidential system with a nationally elected executive and
locally elected legislature. Now the budget bill may include earmarked projects that constrain
the executive in some states of nature and the legislature never leaves the executive full
￿ exibility to spend as much and how she prefers in all states of nature. We show that
the equilibrium budget bill is completely in￿ exible when the executive￿ s constituency is much
broader than that of the legislature, but it always leaves some discretion to the executive when
her constituency is only slightly wider. Section 6 treats the case of overlapping interests. An
important consideration in this case is whether the executive or legislature serves a larger
set of interests. When the legislature serves a larger constituency, the executive prefers to
spend more than the legislature on groups of common concern, whereas the opposite is when
the executive￿ s constituency is larger. When the executive prefers to spend more on these
groups, the legislature will opt to constrain the size of the overall budget. When she prefers
to spend less, the legislature will induce extra spending in some states of nature with a list
of earmarks.
The ￿nal section contains some concluding remarks.
2 A Model of the Budget Process
The polity comprises N groups of citizens distinguished by their preferences over the allo-
cation of public spending. The government undertakes a set of projects and ￿nances its
spending with a poll tax. Each project bene￿ts the members of one and only one group. We
4can think of the groups as electoral districts, although our model can be interpreted more
broadly as applying to spending that bene￿ts particular interest groups, such as workers in
the steel industry, owners of oil reserves, or the elderly.
The government consists of a legislative branch and an executive branch, each with a
distinct role in the budgetary process. The legislature￿ s job is to design a budget bill, which
the executive and the agencies under her control then must implement. A budget bill includes
a spending limit and obliges the executive to undertake certain designated projects. Within
the discretion left by the law, the executive decides how much to spend and how to spend
it. We treat the bill as an incomplete contract; that is, it cannot specify state-contingent
spending rules. The legislature may, however, choose to leave ￿ exibility to the executive to
respond to contingencies that arise.
We assume that the legislature and executive each represent certain interests. For exam-
ple, the majority delegation in the legislature may comprise representatives of a particular
set of geographic districts. Then the legislature may act to enhance the well-being of res-
idents of those districts. The executive may represent the same interests, or a broader or
narrower set of interests, or simply a di⁄erent set of interests. We let E ￿ N denote the
set of groups represented by the executive e and L ￿ N the set of groups represented by
those with decision-making power in the legislature l. The decision makers in the legislature
tailor the budget law to maximize the aggregate expected welfare of members of L, while the
executive implements the law to maximize the aggregate welfare of members of E.3
The alignment of L and E re￿ ects the political system. For example, in parliamentary
systems, the legislature or its ruling coalition often chooses the prime minister. When a
majority party rules the parliament, this may mean that the objectives of the legislature and
the executive are closely aligned or perhaps even the same. With a coalition government,
the prime minister may share the objectives of one party in the coalition, which may be
narrower than those of the coalition as a whole. In a presidential system, the executive may
be nationally elected and beholden to a broader constituency than that of the legislative
majority. Although the correspondence between the political system and the alignment of
interests between executive and legislature is not exact, we believe that there are su¢ cient
regularities to warrant our treating the di⁄erent relationships between L and E as proxies
for di⁄erent political institutions and environments.
Every group i 2 N has a utility function
ui = ￿iv(gi) ￿ t ,
3We do not specify the legislature￿ s decision-making process, which may have a bearing on which groups
are included in L. Thus, political institutions can a⁄ect the determination of which interests will be served
by the legislative process. Henceforth, we will use the ￿legislature￿ s constituency￿to mean whatever (narrow
or broad) set of interests are served by those with decision-making power in the legislature.
5where gi ￿ 0 is spending on projects that bene￿t members of group i, v(￿) is a twice con-
tinuously di⁄erentiable, strictly increasing, and concave function of gi, t is a poll tax that is
common to all groups and used to ￿nance government spending, and ￿i is a random shock to
the productivity of spending on projects that bene￿t group i.4 The random shocks are gov-
erned by a joint cumulative distribution function F(￿), where ￿ = (￿1;￿2;:::;￿n) is the vector
of shocks and n is the total number of groups. We assume that F (￿) is continuous, symmet-
ric5, and strictly positive on the support S = ￿n
i=1 [￿min;￿max], where 0 < ￿min < ￿max < 1.
We also assume that limg!0 v0(g) = 1, which implies that the marginal productivity of the
￿rst bit of spending on any group i is extremely high in every state of nature.
The budgetary process plays out as follows. First, l designs a budget bill to maximize
the expected sum of utilities for groups in L. The bill, which must be passed before the
realization of uncertainty, contains two components. First, it imposes a spending limit G
that caps the total size of the budget. Second, it delineates a set of projects (￿earmarks￿ )
that the executive must carry out. These earmarks impose minimum spending levels by
group; i.e., e must spend at least ￿ g1 on projects that bene￿t group 1, ￿ g2 on projects that
bene￿t group 2, and so on. Let ￿ g = (￿ g1; ￿ g2;:::; ￿ gn): Of course, the legislature allows e
maximum ￿ exibility by setting G = 1 (or, at least as high as what e will choose to spend
when ￿ = (￿max;￿max;:::;￿max)) and ￿ g = (0;0;:::;0). The budget bill must be internally
consistent in the sense that G ￿
P
i2N ￿ gi.
After the budget bill has been passed, the random shocks to productivity are realized.
Then e chooses a spending program g = (g1;g2;:::;gn) and a tax rate t to maximize
P
i2E ui.
These choices must be consistent with the provisions of the bill; that is, gi ￿ ￿ gi for all i 2 N
and
P
i2N gi ￿ G: Also, the executive￿ s budget must balance, so that the tax levy on each




=n. Clearly, the spending program in state ￿ that maximizes the
executive￿ s objective is










subject to g ￿ ￿ g and
X
i2N





=n is the fraction of the n groups that is part of the executive￿ s con-
stituency, E.
The legislature anticipates the spending behavior of e, as represented in (1). It chooses
4The utility function omits a constant that represents the gross income of the group.
5By symmetry, we mean that F(￿1;:::;￿i;:::;￿j;:::;￿n) = F(￿1;:::;￿j;:::;￿i;:::;￿n), for all i and j.

















subject to ￿ g ￿ 0 and
X
i2N
￿ gi ￿ G ,




=n is the fraction of groups that
is part of the legislature￿ s constituency, L.
Two obvious features of the equilibrium budget bill and spending program follow imme-
diately from (1) and (2). First, l imposes no spending requirements for groups that are not
part of its constituency; i.e.,
￿ gl
i = 0 for all i = 2 L.
Second, e undertakes no projects to bene￿t groups that are neither in its own constituency






= 0 for all i = 2 (L [ E).
3 No Con￿ ict between Legislature and Executive
The simplest scenario to analyze is one in which the legislature and executive serve identical
interests; i.e., E = L. Arguably, this situation can arise in a parliamentary system when
a single party controls a majority in the legislature and the ruling party selects the prime
minister. In this setting, the legislature has no reason to constrain the actions of e and the
executive can use any discretion left to her to target spending to where it is most productive.
This serves not only her own interests but also those of l. Accordingly, the equilibrium budget
bill leaves maximum ￿ exibility.
To state this more formally and to set the stage for what follows, let us de￿ne gmin =
argmaxgi ￿minv(gi) ￿ ￿egi and gmax = argmaxgi ￿minv(gi) ￿ ￿egi. These are respectively the
expenditures that an unconstrained executive would devote to projects that bene￿t a group
i 2 E if ￿i = ￿min and if ￿i = ￿max. Clearly, the executive will choose gi 2 [gmin;gmax]
unless the budget bill mandates higher spending on group i or a budget cap binds. When
the legislature and executive serve identical interests, the equilibrium budget bill can now be
characterized as follows.
Proposition 1 Let E = L. Then ￿ gl
i = 0 for all i = 2 L, ￿ gl
i ￿ gmin for all i 2 L, and
Gl ￿ ￿lngmax.
7The proposition implies that neither the list of required projects nor the overall spending
cap binds the executive￿ s choices in any state of nature. The proof is simple. The legislature￿ s
most preferred spending in state ￿ is argmaxg
￿P
i2L ￿iv (gi) ￿ ￿l P
i2N gi
￿
. But when E = L
(and thus ￿e = ￿l), this is exactly equal to argmaxg
￿P




that the executive would make if unconstrained. Thus, l maximizes its objective state-by-
state by leaving maximal ￿ exibility to e. It fares worse by imposing binding constraints.
One simple budget bill that satis￿es Proposition 1 is
￿
￿ gl;Gl￿
= (0;1); i.e., the legislature
insists on no projects and imposes no limit to the size of the budget. But this is not the only
possibility. It could equally well specify a set of earmarked projects for groups in l as long as
these projects would anyway be undertaken by the executive in the ￿worst￿state of nature
for group i; i.e., ￿ gl
i ￿ gmin. And it could set a ￿nite budget limit as long as the limit equals
or exceeds the maximum that e would spend in the ￿best￿state of nature for all groups in
E; i.e., Gl ￿ ￿lngmax.
4 Narrow Executive Interests
We now consider a situation in which the executive serves a narrower set of interests than
those favored by the legislature. Such a situation can arise, for example, in a parliamentary
system with a coalition government. Then the agencies that have responsibility for and
discretion in designing spending programs may seek to satisfy only groups favored by their
own parties. But these may be a subset of the groups collectively served by all parties in the
coalition. Or it may arise in a parliamentary system with a minority government, because
then the interest of the cabinet is narrower than any majority in the parliament.
Formally, we assume that E is a proper subset of L. This implies that there is at least one
group in L that is not in E and therefore that ￿l > ￿e. We use the notation L=E to denote
the set of groups L\(￿ E). The executive will not spend voluntarily on projects that bene￿t
groups not in E, because such spending increases the tax burden for her constituency without
generating any gains for these groups. Accordingly, for i 2 L=E, ge
i = ￿ gl
i. If the legislature
wants these groups to be served by any public spending, it must specify the desired projects
in the budget bill. Spending on these groups, then, is invariant to the state of nature.
We can rewrite the spending program for an executive with narrow interests. She spends
exactly what is required by the budget bill on groups not in E while choosing for her own

























￿iv(gi) ￿ ￿e X
i2E
gi
subject to gE ￿ ￿ glE and
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i2E





We will show that, anticipating this behavior by e, the legislature never requires the executive
to spend more than she would anyway like to on groups in E, but always passes a budget cap
that binds in some states of nature. More formally, the equilibrium budget bill is characterized
as follows.
Proposition 2 Let E ￿ L. Then (i) ￿ gl
i = 0 for all i = 2 L, ￿ gl
i = argmaxgi [^ ￿v(gi) ￿ ￿lgi] > 0
for all i 2 L=E, and ￿ gl





To prove the proposition, we proceed in stages, building intuition in the process. Figure
1 depicts a case in which E consists of two groups, E = f1;2g. The curve we represents an
indi⁄erence curve for the executive for a given realization of ￿. Another such curve (with
higher welfare for e) is represented by the elliptical curve that is contained in we. Along any
of the executive￿ s indi⁄erence curves, We =
P
i2E ￿iv (gi) ￿ ￿e P
i2E gi is constant. Point a
in the ￿gure represents the executive￿ s optimal, unconstrained choice of spending on the two
groups when the state of nature is ￿.
9Line ~ R ~ R depicts combinations of g1 and g2 such that g1 +g2 = G￿
P
i2L=E ￿ gi. These are
the spending combinations that are feasible for e given the budget cap G and the mandated
spending on groups not in E,
P
i2L=E ￿ gi. For large enough values of G, the budget line passes
above point a, in which case the executive would choose the allocation of spending represented
by point a, assuming, as we will for the moment, that no minimum spending requirements
bind for the groups in E. When ~ R ~ R passes below point a, as drawn, the executive￿ s optimal
spending on the two groups is represented at point c, where the indi⁄erence curve we is
tangent to ~ R ~ R. At this point, ￿1v0 (g1) = ￿2v0 (g2).
Curve wl depicts one of the legislature￿ s indi⁄erence curves that is relevant for the same
realization of ￿. Along this curve, Wl =
P
i2E ￿iv (gi) ￿ ￿l P
i2E gi is constant. Another
indi⁄erence curve is represented by the ellipse contained in wl, while point b represents the
legislature￿ s preferred spending on groups 1 and 2 when the state is ￿. Note that point b lies
to the southwest of a, because e and l perceive the same bene￿ts from spending on groups 1
and 2, but l has a broader constituency than e and thus perceives a greater cost. Note too
that wl is tangent to ~ R ~ R at point c, because the marginal rate of substitution of spending on
groups 1 and 2 is the same for the legislature as it is for the executive. In fact, this is true for
every spending line that passes below point a; for a given level of spending on groups in E,
the executive and legislature share the same preferences over the composition of spending on
those groups. Finally, note that the same argument applies when there are more than two
groups in E. The executive and legislature agree that spending in state ￿ should be allocated
so that ￿iv0 (gi) = ￿jv0 (gj) for every i and j in E. Their con￿ ict concerns only the desired
level of spending, with e preferring to spend more than l, for any given realization of ￿.
Since e allocates a given residual budget among groups in E exactly as l would want
her to in all states of nature, the legislature can only lose by constraining this aspect of the
executive￿ s decision. Accordingly, the mandated spending on each group in E should be set
low enough that it never binds in any state of nature. But the pro￿ igate tendencies of the
executive, as perceived by the legislature, motivate its choice of an optimal spending limit.
To see that the legislature chooses a spending limit Gl that binds in some states of nature
consider the set of ￿best￿states for e; i.e., those in which ￿i = ￿max for all i 2 E.6 Suppose
that the budget does not bind in any of these states. Then the executive would choose
ge
i = gmax for all i 2 E in such states and indeed would choose her ￿rst-best level of spending
on groups in E for all ￿ 2 S, because her desired total spending on groups in E is highest
when the productivity of that spending is maximal. Now consider a small reduction in the
size of the budget to a level just below G = ￿engmax +
P
i2L=E ￿ gl
i. This induces a reduction
in the executive￿ s spending on groups in her constituency when ￿i = ￿max for all i 2 E, but
leaves her behavior unchanged in all other states. But note that the legislature prefers to
6We refer to a ￿set￿of best states because we do not restrict the realizations of ￿i for i = 2 E.
10spend less than the executive on groups in E for any given realization of ￿; because ￿l > ￿e.
Therefore, a reduction in the budget cap from G = ￿engmax +
P
i2L=E ￿ gl
i to something a bit
smaller has a bene￿cial e⁄ect on the legislature￿ s welfare in those (few) states in which it
binds, and no e⁄ect on expected welfare in other states.7
Finally, the proposition speci￿es the required spending for groups in L=E. The legislature
￿xes spending for these groups at the level that it regards as optimal for the mean value of ￿i.8
Since the executive will not devote discretionary spending to groups outside its constituency,
the legislature must pre-specify a ￿xed set of projects and does so with the mean productivity
level in mind.
5 Broad Executive Interests
In a presidential system, the executive often is chosen in a national campaign, whereas in-
dividual legislators may be elected locally. In such circumstances it is reasonable to assume
that the executive￿ s constituency will be broader than that of the majority delegation in the
legislature. Indeed, this is often said of the United States, where, for example, the president
often takes a broader view about trade and industrial policies than the Congress. We now
examine the budget process in a setting in which the executive represents a broader set of
interests than the legislature; in particular, we assume that L is a proper subset of E.
Clearly, the legislature will not insist on earmarks for groups that are not part of its
constituency. But l must anticipate that, if left with discretion, e will always opt to spend on
groups in E=L, because from her point of view the ￿rst bit of spending on such groups yields
high marginal return. The legislature may wish to constrain the budget tightly to avoid such
spending on these groups. And it may wish to earmark spending for groups that are in both
































l) is de￿ned as the expected welfare of the legislature when the budget is any G and the vector
















density of all realizations of ￿ that have ￿i = ￿max for all i 2 E and we make use of the fact that the spending





































8Considering that the executive will not devote discretionary spending to groups in L=E, the legislature￿ s
expected welfare can be written as the sum of a component that depends on its mandated spending on these
groups and a component that depends on anticipated spending on groups in E. The former component is
E
hP
i2L=E ￿iv(￿ gi) ￿ ￿
l￿ gi
i
from which it follows that the optimal required level of spending on each such group
is ￿ g
l
i = argmaxgi ^ ￿v(gi) ￿ ￿
lgi.
11L and E, because with ￿l < ￿e, it always prefers to spend more on these groups than the
executive does. As we shall see, the legislature has two very di⁄erent strategies that may be
optimal, depending on the distribution F(￿) and the bene￿t function v(￿).
At one extreme, the legislature might dictate spending ￿ gl
i = ￿ gl for all groups i 2 L, while
at the same time capping total outlays at Gl = ￿ln￿ gl. Such a budget bill leaves the executive
with no discretionary spending. By locking in the budget allocation, l can ensure a relatively
high level of spending on its favorite groups and avoid the tax bill that would result from
projects aimed at groups that are not part of its constituency. We shall refer to this approach
as a rigid strategy (and the associated bill as a rigid budget).
Alternatively, the legislature may leave some (or much) discretion to the executive. A
￿exible strategy is one that allows e to choose some aspects of the spending program in at
least some states of nature. The executive has such ￿ exibility whenever Gl > ￿ln￿ gl. The
potential attraction for the legislature from following such a strategy is that the executive can
allocate spending among the groups in L according to the realized productivity of the various
projects. The disadvantage, of course, is that the executive may spend the unencumbered
funds on groups in E that are not in L, and it may choose to spend less on groups in L than
the legislature would want in some states of nature. We call a budget bill fully ￿exible if
Gl ￿ ￿engmax and ￿ gl ￿ gmin. A fully ￿ exible budget bill gives the executive a large enough
budget to spend on each group as much as she would wish for all ￿ 2 S and it does not
require her to spend on any group more than she would wish for any ￿ 2 S.
But, in fact, the legislature never opts for such a bill when the executive has broader
interests. In other words, we assert
Proposition 3 Let L ￿ E. Then an equilibrium budget bill never is fully ￿exible; i.e., either
Gl < ￿engmax or ￿ gl
i = ￿ gl > gmin for all i 2 L:
To see why this is so, suppose to the contrary that G ￿ ￿engmax and ￿ gi = ￿ g = gmin for all
i 2 L. By raising ￿ g slightly, the legislature would a⁄ect spending only on groups in L (since
spending on groups in E=L never is constrained when G ￿ ￿engmax) and only in states in
which ￿i is very close to ￿min for some i 2 L. In such states, the contribution of spending
on group i to the expected welfare of the legislature is ￿minv(gi) ￿ ￿lgi times the density of
the unconditional distribution of ￿i at ￿i = ￿min, which we denote by fi(￿min). Thus, the




But ￿minv0(gmin) = ￿e, by the de￿nition of gmin. Therefore, the increased spending in-




fi(￿min)d￿ g > 0. Intuitively, the legislature wants more spending for groups in L
than the executive does in every state of nature, because e internalizes a greater tax burden
from such spending than l. If the budget were fully ￿ exible, the legislature could certainly
bene￿t by insisting on slightly more spending than an unconstrained executive would choose
12in the state with lowest productivity. That would move the spending in that state closer
to the legislature￿ s desideratum without any o⁄setting cost. Indeed, with Gl ￿ ￿engmax,
the legislature earmarks spending for each group in L at a su¢ ciently high level so as to
ensure that there exist states which, if realized, would cause the legislature to regret having
demanded so much.
Let us further consider the remaining alternatives of a rigid budget and a (somewhat)
￿ exible budget, to shed light on the relative attractiveness of each to the legislature. Suppose













^ ￿v(￿ g) ￿ ￿l￿ g
i
.
It follows that the legislature￿ s optimal rigid rule for spending on groups in L is ￿ gR, where
￿ gR satis￿es
^ ￿v0(￿ gR) = ￿l . (3)
Note that ￿ gR > gmin, because ^ ￿ > ￿min and ￿e > ￿l. Thus, if the legislature adopts a
rigid budget, it insists on spending for each group in L that exceeds what the executive
would spend on that group if the productivity of spending were at its minimum. Indeed,
the legislature might insist on spending for each group in L that exceeds what the executive
would spend on the group if realized productivity were at the maximum; this will be the case
if ￿e=￿l ￿ ￿max=^ ￿.
Now consider the alternative legislative strategy that allows the executive to respond to
the realization of uncertainty. Let Gl
F denote the budget cap in an optimal ￿ exible strategy
and let ￿ gl
F be the mandated spending per group in L in such a strategy, with Gl
F > ￿ln￿ gl
F.
We ￿rst observe that the legislature never chooses Gl
F close to ￿ln￿ gl
F. In other words, if
the budget bill includes a discretionary budget, the portion of the budget that exceeds the
mandated spending never is small. To see why this is so, suppose to the contrary that
the legislature were to leave the executive with discretion to allocate only a small amount,
Gl￿￿ln￿ g. The marginal bene￿t to e from spending these funds on a group in E=L is at least
￿minv0(0) ￿ ￿e. But this magnitude is positive and necessarily greater than ￿maxv0(￿ g) ￿ ￿e,
the most that the executive￿ s marginal bene￿t could be from spending the funds to bene￿t
a group in L. Thus, l anticipates that a small discretionary budget always will be spent
and always on groups that are not part of its constituency. Such spending would reduce the
legislature￿ s welfare compared to a rigid law with G = ￿ln￿ g. It follows that if the legislature
pursues a ￿ exible strategy, it always leaves a discretionary budget that is su¢ ciently large to
induce extra spending on groups in L in at least some states of nature.
13Next we observe that when the budget bill admits ￿ exibility, the legislature never man-
dates spending on a group in L as large as what e would allocate to that group when spending
is most productive; i.e., ￿ gl
F < gmax. If the legislature were to set ￿ g ￿ gmax, there would exist
no realization of ￿ in which e would devote discretionary spending to any group in L. Ac-
cordingly, with ￿ g ￿ gmax, the legislature would gain by eliminating all discretionary spending
and setting the budget cap at ￿ln￿ g. By doing so, it would reduce the expected tax bill for
its constituents without forfeiting any of their pet projects.
The alternative strategies of rigidity and ￿ exibility may represent local optima in the
legislature￿ s choice of a spending cap and list of earmarked projects. A global comparison
of these alternatives is di¢ cult in general, but some su¢ cient conditions that tilt the choice
to one option or the other can be found. First, we show that the legislature prefers a rigid
budget when the size of its constituency is small relative to that of the executive or when the
range of random productivities is small.
Proposition 4 Let L ￿ E. If ￿e=￿l > ￿max=￿min, the equilibrium budget bill is Gl = GR
and ￿ gl
i = ￿ gR for all i 2 L, where ￿ gR = argmaxg ^ ￿v(g) ￿ ￿lg and GR = ￿ln￿ gR.
The proof is straightforward. Suppose to the contrary that l chooses a ￿ exible budget
with ￿ g = ￿ gl
F and G = Gl
F > ￿ln￿ gl
F. If ￿e=￿max > ￿l=￿min, l prefers to spend more on a group
i 2 L when ￿i = ￿min than the spending that e would like to allocate to that same group
when ￿i = ￿max.9 But we have just observed that, if a ￿ exible strategy is optimal, ￿ gl
F is never
as large as gmax, because otherwise the executive would not devote discretionary spending
to a group in L in any state of nature. It follows that l prefers more spending on group i
than ￿ gl
F in every ￿ 2 S. The legislature can improve on the hypothesized ￿ exible budget by
mandating spending of ￿ gl
F on every group i 2 L and setting a rigid budget G = ￿ln￿ gl
F. It
can do even better by choosing the optimal rigid spending plan, ￿ gl
i = ￿ gR for all i 2 L and the
optimal rigid budget, Gl = GR = ￿ln￿ gR. This contradicts the supposition that (Gl
F; ￿ gl
F) is
optimal for the legislature.
The legislature adopts a rigid budget when ￿l is small relative to ￿e, because in such
circumstances the executive perceives a much greater cost per unit of spending on groups
in L than does the legislature and so she is inclined to spend much less on these groups in
any given state of nature than the legislature would like. In order to compel a high level of
spending, the legislature must earmark su¢ cient funds in the budget. But once it does so,
it will not wish to leave any discretionary budget to the executive, because it will anticipate
that she would spend any such funds to bene￿t groups in E=L.
9The legislature￿ s optimal spending on group i when ￿i = ￿min solves v
0(g) = ￿
l=￿min. The executive￿ s
optimal spending on group i when ￿i = ￿max solves v
0(g) = ￿





14A small range for ￿ also favors rigidity, because the potential gains to l from allowing e
to respond to ￿ uctuations in productivity then are small. If the legislature cannot gain much
from having high spending in states with above average productivity, it will not be willing to
bear the cost of allowing the executive to spend on groups that are in her constituency but
not its own.
Next we show that the legislature adopts a ￿ exible budget when the fraction of the
population that is served by e but outside its own constituency is su¢ ciently small. In
particular, we have
Proposition 5 Let L ￿ E. If ￿e=￿l is close to 1, the equilibrium budget bill leaves some
discretion to e; i.e., Gl > ￿ln￿ gl, where ￿ gl
i = ￿ gl for all i 2 L.
Note that in the limit, as ￿e approaches ￿l, the legislature￿ s problem becomes one of
coincident interests, in which (by Proposition 1), a fully ￿ exible budget is optimal. Not only
that, but when ￿l = ￿e the legislature￿ s expected welfare from a fully ￿ exible budget is
strictly greater than the expected welfare it can achieve with the best rigid budget, (GR; ￿ gR).
And the expected welfare levels under both a rigid strategy and a fully ￿ exible strategy are
continuous functions of the parameters ￿e and ￿l. So, full ￿ exibility continues to dominate
the best rigid budget from the legislature￿ s perspective when ￿e is greater than ￿l but the
di⁄erence is small. Proposition 3 states that the full ￿ exibility is not optimal for l when
￿e > ￿l. Therefore, the legislature￿ s preferred budget must yield higher expected welfare
than the fully ￿ exible budget and hence than the rigid budget as well.
Perfectly-Correlated Productivity Shocks
Until now, we have not assumed anything in particular about the correlation of shocks to
the productivity of the various spending projects. We can, however, say a bit more about the
outcome of the budget process with broad executive interests for the special case in which
public spending is equally valuable to all groups in a given state of nature; that is, when the
￿i￿ s are perfectly correlated.
We let ￿i = ￿ for all i 2 E and denote the cumulative distribution function of ￿ by F(￿).
The legislature still faces a choice between a rigid budget bill and a (not fully) ￿ exible bill.
The former option continues to feature the mandated spending ￿ gR = argmaxg ^ ￿v(g)￿￿lg on
all groups in L and G = GR = ￿en￿ gR. We consider further the latter option.
Suppose that the legislature earmarks spending for each group i 2 L at level ￿ g, the
determination of which we will discuss shortly. Then, in states with low productivity of
public projects, the executive will devote all discretionary spending to groups in E=L. The
marginal product of such spending is ￿v
0
(gi), for i 2 E=L which exceeds the marginal product
of spending additional funds on groups in L as long as gi < ￿ g. Indeed, the ￿rst (￿e ￿ ￿l)n￿ g
dollars of discretionary spending will be targeted to groups in E=L, if the level of productivity
15justi￿es her spending that much. Only when spending has been equalized across groups in her
broad constituency might the executive contemplate additional spending for groups that the
legislature cares about. It follows that it is never optimal for l to set a budget cap G > ￿ln￿ g
in the range from ￿ln￿ g to ￿en￿ g, because with a cap in this range no discretionary funds ever
are spent to bene￿t the legislature￿ s constituency.
Consider then the expected marginal bene￿t to the legislature from increasing the budget
cap from a level that exceeds ￿en￿ g to something higher, but such that G < ￿en￿ gmax. In
states with low productivity of public goods, the budget constraint does not bind and giving
the executive the opportunity to spend more will not a⁄ect her decisions. In states with high
productivity, by contrast, the executive will opt to spend at least part of the incremental
funds. But since spending on each group is equally productive and v00(g) < 0, she will spread
the spending evenly among all groups in E. Thus, in all states in which the budget cap binds,
dgi=dG = 1=￿en for all i 2 E.
How does this increased spending a⁄ect the legislature￿ s expected welfare? The welfare of
l in a given state of nature is Wl = ￿
P
i2L v(gi) ￿ ￿l P
i2N gi. When the budget constraint
binds,
P










But gi is the same for all i 2 E when G > ￿en￿ g and we have just observed that dgi=dG =
1=￿en in such circumstances. Also, ￿v
0
(gi) > ￿e in all states in which the budget constraint
binds, because otherwise e would allocate her ￿rst-best level to each group and not spend




















￿ ￿l = 0.
We conclude that if the legislature ￿nds it desirable to set a spending cap above ￿en￿ g, it gains
from each incremental increase in G and so should set the cap high enough that it never binds.
Intuitively, a larger cap allows the executive discretion to spend more in high productivity
states. With perfectly correlated shocks, when e is willing to spend additional funds on
projects bene￿ting all groups in its constituency, l concurs with this decision, because the
legislature garners a fraction ￿l=￿e of the bene￿ts while bearing only the fraction ￿l of the
costs.
We now discuss the optimal choice of ￿ g in a ￿ exible budget. We know already that
￿ gl
F > gmin, because full ￿ exibility is never optimal. And we have seen that ￿ gl
F < gmax, because
if it were not so, the legislature would have no reason to allow discretionary spending. Let
us de￿ne ￿c as the value of ￿ at which the executive views the constraint gi ￿ ￿ g for i 2 L
to be marginally binding; i.e., ￿c = ￿e=v0(￿ g). For ￿ < ￿c, the executive spends ￿ g = ~ g(￿c)
16on groups in L and ~ g(￿) on groups in E=L, where ~ g(￿) is the executive￿ s ￿rst-best choice of
spending on a group when the productivity of spending is ￿.10 For ￿ ￿ ￿c, the executive
spends at her ￿rst-best level on all groups in E, because we have already seen that the
optimal ￿ exible budget never constrains the executive￿ s total spending. We can convert the
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where the second line follows from the de￿nition of ￿c. It follows that, if there exists a
￿c 2 (￿min;￿max) at which the ￿rst-order condition @Ul
F=@￿c = 0 is satis￿ed, then the second-
order condition @2Ul
F=@ (￿c)
2 < 0 also is satis￿ed at that ￿c. Moreover, if such an interior
solution exists for the legislature￿ s favorite choice of ￿c, it satis￿es
E [￿ j ￿ < ￿c] = ￿c
￿l
￿e . (5)
Equation (5) determines ￿l
c (if such an interior solution exists) as a function of ￿l=￿e and
properties of the distribution function F (￿). Notice that the properties of the utility function
v (￿) do not a⁄ect the solution. The level of mandated spending per group, ￿ gl
F, in a possible
equilibrium with a ￿ exible budget then is given by ￿ gl
F = g(￿l
c).
We can summarize the discussion in
Proposition 6 Let L ￿ E and suppose the productivity shocks ￿i for i 2 E are perfectly
correlated. Then either ￿ gl
i = ￿ gR for all i 2 L and Gl = ￿ln￿ gR, or ￿ gl
i = ~ g(￿l
c) for all i 2 L and
Gl ￿ ￿engmax.
In other words, with perfectly correlated shocks the equilibrium budget is either rigid or it
has positive earmarked spending on every group in L and no e⁄ective cap on total spending.
As an example, consider the uniform distribution F (￿) = (￿ ￿ ￿min)=(￿max ￿ ￿min) for
10That is, ~ g (￿) is de￿ned implicitly by ￿v
0[~ g (￿)] ￿ ￿
e.
17￿ 2 [￿min;￿max]. In this case E [￿ j ￿ < ￿c] = (￿c + ￿min)=2 for ￿c 2 [￿min;￿max], which implies
E [￿ j ￿ < ￿c] > ￿c￿l=￿e
for all ￿l=￿e < ^ ￿=￿max. Therefore, if ￿l=￿e < ^ ￿=￿max, there is no interior solution for ￿ gl
F.
Rather, the legislature￿ s optimal spending requirement for groups in L conditional on there
being no spending cap is ￿ gi = gmax for all i 2 L. But then the legislature does better by
imposing a rigid budget with ￿ gl
i = ￿ gl
R for all i 2 L and Gl = ￿ln￿ gR.11








F = ~ g(￿l
c), and the equilibrium budget is either ￿ gl
i = ￿ gR for all i 2 L and Gl = ￿ln￿ gR, or
￿ gl
i = ~ g(￿l
c) for all i 2 L and Gl ￿ ￿engmax, whichever yields higher expected welfare for the
legislature.
The case of broad executive interests presents in stark contrast the trade-o⁄ facing the
legislature between delegating budgeting responsibilities to the executive and not. On the one
hand, a rigid strategy is available that ensures that there will be no funds devoted to projects
that do not serve the legislature￿ s political aims. On the other hand, a ￿ exible alternative is
available that allows spending to be targeted to groups with greater need. But in order to
enjoy the fruits of such ￿ exibility, the legislature must be prepared to accept the tax burden
associated with discretionary spending on groups in the executive￿ s constituency that are not
part of its own. Since the executive devotes the ￿rst dose of discretionary funds to groups
in E=L, the expected cost to the legislature of creating a small discretionary budget is large.
The legislature will never choose such an option, but instead will consider leaving a large
discretionary budget, especially in situations where the di⁄erence between ￿e and ￿l is small
and the degree of uncertainty is large.
6 Overlapping Interests
The remaining case of interest arises when some groups are served by both the legislature and
the executive, while others are part of the constituency of just one branch or the other.12 Such
situations can arise, for example, in presidential systems with ￿divided government￿￿ when
11The legislature fares better by setting G = ￿
lngmax when ￿ g = gmax than it does by setting G ￿ ￿
engmax.
It fares even better by choosing the optimal rigid budget.
12In principle, there is another case that can arise when the executive and legislature serve non-overlapping
interests. However, this case seems empirically unlikely. Moreover, it has an obvious equilibrium; the legisla-
ture mandates spending according to the average productivity for its own constituency and leaves no discretion
to the executive.
18the executive hails from one political party and the legislature is controlled by another. We
let B = L\E (for ￿both￿ ) denote the overlap set between E and L, which contains a fraction




the set B is not empty and is a proper subset of both L and E.
Our previous analysis extends readily to the case with overlapping interests in which
￿e > ￿l; i.e., the executive serves a greater number of interest groups than the legislature.
First, the legislature must look after the (￿l ￿￿b)n groups in L=B with earmarked spending.
The spending on these groups cannot be made responsive to the realization of ￿, because
the executive will not spend discretionary funds on these groups. So, the legislature requires
spending on these groups at the level that it deems optimal for the average productivity level.
As concerns the remaining groups, the legislature faces a problem identical to that addressed
in Section 5 for the case of broad executive interests. There are ￿bn groups in B about
which both e and l care and
￿
￿e ￿ ￿b￿
n groups that are of concern only to the executive.
Moreover, the executive prefers to spend less on any group i 2 B than the legislature does,
because the tax burden bears more heavily on her larger constituency than it does on the
smaller constituency of the legislature. The legislature designs a budget that does not give
e full ￿ exibility to decide spending on the groups in E and that might or might not be fully
rigid. We summarize these ￿ndings in
Proposition 7 Let B = L \ E be non-empty, and suppose that ￿e > ￿l > ￿b. Then
￿ gl
i = ^ g = argmaxg ^ ￿v (g) ￿ ￿lg for all i 2 L=B. Moreover, either (i) ￿ gl
i = ￿ gR for all i 2 B
and Gl = ￿bn￿ gR +
￿
￿l ￿ ￿b￿
n^ g, or (ii) ￿ gl




Gl ￿ ￿engmax +
￿
￿l ￿ ￿b￿
n^ g, and either Gl < ￿engmax +
￿
￿l ￿ ￿b￿
n^ g or ￿ gF > gmin.
Some new issues arise when there are overlapping interests and ￿e < ￿l. Again the
legislature must mandate spending (at level ^ g) for groups in its own constituency that are
not of concern to the executive. And again the legislature must be wary of the executive￿ s
inclination to spend on groups in E=L, because such spending will raise the tax bill for its
constituents without generating any bene￿ts for them. But as concerns the groups in B, now
it is the executive that is inclined to spend more extravagantly.
We note ￿rst that, when ￿b < ￿e < ￿l, the budget cap must bind in some states of
nature. A budget cap that never binds means that G ￿
￿
￿l ￿ ￿b￿
n^ g + ￿engmax. But
when G is so large, the legislature could reduce the spending limit to a level just below
￿
￿l ￿ ￿b￿
n^ g +￿engmax, which would bind only when ￿i = ￿max for all i in E. The executive
would respond to such a cut in the budget cap by shaving outlays in this state equally for all
groups in its constituency. The resulting reduction in spending on groups in E=L represents
a pure tax savings for the constituents of L. And the cut in spending on groups in B also





19Next observe that a rigid budget bill may be optimal in these circumstances, as may a
bill that allows the executive discretion in some states. Suppose, for example, that ￿b is
small and ￿e is large. Then the legislature will perceive only a small expected bene￿t from
allowing spending on groups in B to respond to productivity shocks, but a large expected cost
of allowing the executive to spend on groups in E=L. The legislature adopts a rigid budget
in this situation. In contrast, if ￿e ￿ ￿b and ￿l ￿ ￿e are small compared to ￿b, the interests
of the executive and legislature nearly coincide. Then the expected cost to the legislature
of discretionary spending on groups in E=L will be small, and the bene￿ts of ￿ exibility will
dominate.
We can say a bit more about the special case in which the shocks to productivity are
perfectly correlated across groups. Then either the legislature sets a rigid budget or its
earmarks for groups in B will not bind in any states of nature. To prove this assertion, let ￿ gB
denote the level of spending mandated by the legislature for groups i 2 B in a budget that
allows the executive some discretion. Note that the legislature never would set a budget cap
that falls in the range between
￿
￿l ￿ ￿b￿
n^ g + ￿bn￿ gB and
￿
￿l ￿ ￿b￿
n^ g + ￿en￿ gB, for if it did
so, the executive would devote all discretionary spending to groups in E=L. Now consider
the legislature￿ s optimal choice of ￿ gB. As before, we may think of the legislature as choosing
￿c, the highest realization of the productivity shock for which the spending mandates bind.
For ￿ 2 [￿min,￿c] the executive spends ~ g(￿) on groups in E=L and ￿ gB = ~ g(￿c) for groups in
B. For ￿ 2 [￿c;￿G] the executive spends ~ g(￿) on all groups in E, where ￿G is the lowest
realization of ￿ for which the spending cap binds.13 And for ￿ 2 [￿G;￿max], the executive
divides the discretionary budget, G￿
￿
￿l ￿ ￿b￿
n^ g, equally among the ￿en groups in E. The


























￿bn￿v [~ g(￿G)] ￿ ￿l￿bn~ g(￿G)
o
dF(￿) ,
where the ￿rst term on the right-hand side represents l￿ s bene￿ts and costs from spending
on groups in E for states in which the spending mandates bind but the budget cap does
not, the second term represents bene￿ts and costs from spending on groups in E in states in
which neither the spending mandates nor the budget cap binds, and the ￿nal term represents
bene￿ts and costs from spending on groups in E for states in which the budget cap binds






en￿ gB. It follows that the budget cap does not bind





n^ g + ￿
en~ g(￿G).
Therefore ￿G > ￿c.
20but the minimum spending requirements do not.14 Now we can calculate the e⁄ect on the
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dF (￿) < 0;
where the inequality follows from the fact that E [￿ j ￿ < ￿c] < ￿c and ae < ￿l. In short, the
legislature bene￿ts from reducing ￿c whenever ￿c > ￿min. Therefore, if the legislature passes
a (partially) ￿ exible budget, it will never choose a minimum spending requirement for groups
in B that binds in any state of nature. Intuitively, the earmarks for groups in B can only
bind in states in which the budget cap does not. But, in these states, the executive is inclined
to spend more on groups in B than the legislature would like. The legislature can only lose
by forcing her to spend even more than she wishes on these groups. So we conclude that
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If ￿min ￿ ^ ￿￿b=￿l, then this derivative is non-positive for all ￿G in the support of the distri-
bution. This implies that the legislature￿ s welfare is maximized for ￿G = ￿min and that the
equilibrium budget bill is rigid. Alternatively, if ￿min < ^ ￿￿b=￿l, then the legislature leaves
some discretion to the executive, but the spending cap binds in some states of nature, because
￿G = ^ ￿￿b=￿l < ￿max.
We have proven
Proposition 8 Let B = L \ E be non-empty, and suppose that ￿l > ￿e > ￿b. Then
￿ gl
i = ^ g = argmaxg ^ ￿v (g) ￿ ￿lg for all i 2 L=B. If the productivity shocks ￿i are perfectly
correlated, then either (i) ￿ gl
i = ￿ gR for all i 2 B and Gl = ￿bn￿ gR +
￿
￿l ￿ ￿b￿
n^ g, or (ii)
￿ gl
i ￿ gmin for all i 2 B and Gl =
P
i2L=B ￿ gl
i + ￿en~ g (￿G) <
P
i2L=B ￿ gl
i + ￿engmax, where
￿min < ￿G = ^ ￿￿b=￿l < ￿max.
14The legislature has additional costs and bene￿ts from spending on groups in L=B, but these are constant
given the mandatory spending level ￿ gi = ^ g for every i 2 L=B.
217 Concluding Remarks
We have studied the determination of overall budget size and the allocation of pork-barrel
spending in a stylized model of the budgetary process. Our model features a separation
of powers between the legislative and executive branches of government. The legislature
designs the budget bill, which can include a cap on total spending and earmarked allocations
to designated projects. The executive implements the bill by deciding which projects to
undertake within the constraints imposed by the law. The executive has the bene￿t of more
current information about the productivity of the di⁄erent possible spending projects. In this
setting, we have focused on con￿ ict of interest between the legislature and the executive as a
source of variation in the budget outcome. Such con￿ ict, we assume, arises from di⁄erences
in the set of interest groups that comprise the constituencies of the executive, on the one
hand, and of the powerful decision makers in the legislature, on the other.
We have identi￿ed the relative sizes of the di⁄erent constituencies as an important deter-
minant of the type of budget bill that is passed. When the executive serves a broader set of
interests than those served by the decision makers among the legislators, the executive will
perceive a greater cost of each pork-barrel project than the legislature. But the executive will
also regard more projects as being potentially bene￿cial. The former consideration indicates
that the legislature will choose to earmark spending for favored constituents. The latter
suggests that those with power in the legislature may wish to foreclose spending on the many
groups that are only of concern to the executive. Such an outcome could be achieved by
their enacting a rigid budget bill, but at the cost of making spending on their favorite groups
unresponsive to the resolution of uncertainty. If the set of groups in E but not in L is not too
large, then the legislature￿ s concern about insu¢ cient spending on groups in B = E \L may
outweigh its concern about excessive spending on groups in E=L, in which case it may elect
to impose no cap on total spending and thereby leave the executive with complete discretion
once she ful￿lls the minimum spending mandated for the groups in L.
The situation is quite di⁄erent when the relative sizes of the two constituencies is reversed.
When the number of groups in L is greater than in E, the executive perceives a smaller cost
of public funds than the legislature. Then the budget bill always includes a spending cap that
binds in some states of nature. The cap restrains the executive in (at least) the states with the
highest productivity of public spending, because the executive does not spend discretionary
funds on groups in L=E and the spending she would like to devote to groups in E=L and
to groups in B exceeds what the legislature would like to see spent. The budget bill may
not include any earmarks for groups in B, because the executive and legislature have no
con￿ ict about the composition of spending on these groups in a given state of nature, and
the executive will want to spend more on these groups than the legislature in most states of
nature, unless there are many groups in E=L that attract the executive￿ s discretionary funds.
22Our comparative political analysis of the budget process is only a start. First, we have
compared regimes with di⁄erent kinds of con￿ icts between the executive and the legislature
for a common (and stylized) set of lawmaking procedures. In reality, ￿scal institutions vary
greatly and these institutional di⁄erences are likely to be at least as important for budget
outcomes as the di⁄erences that we have highlighted here. In particular, parliamentary and
presidential systems are likely to di⁄er not only in the breadth of the interests represented by
each branch of government, but also in the role that the executive branch plays in drawing up
a budget proposal, in the consequences of ex post disagreement about spending priorities, and
in the types of budget bills that can be considered. To fully capture the di⁄erences in these
alternative systems and their many variants, it will be necessary to examine the combined
in￿ uence of particular institutional and procedural di⁄erences and di⁄erences in the objective
functions of the two branches of government. Second, we have taken the objectives of the
executive and ruling coalition in the legislature to be exogenous. But these too are likely to
re￿ ect institutional features of the political regime. In short, we have taken only a small step
toward a better understanding of how di⁄erences across political regimes result in di⁄erent
government spending policies.
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